In this paper, we argue that the ideas, ideals and the rapid proliferation of smart city rhetoric and initiatives globally have been facilitated and promoted by three inter-related communities. A new set of 'urban technocrats' -chief innovation/technology/data officers, project managers, consultants, designers, engineers, change-management civil servants, and academics -many of which have become embedded in city administrations. A smart cities 'epistemic community'; that is, a network of knowledge and policy experts that share a worldview and a common set of normative beliefs, values and practices with respect to addressing urban issues, and work to help decision-makers identify and deploy technological solutions to solve city problems. A wider 'advocacy coalition' of smart city stakeholders and vested interests who collaborate to promote the uptake and embedding of a smart city approach to urban management and governance. We examine the roles of new urban technocrats and the multiscale formation and operation of a smart cities epistemic community and advocacy coalitions, detailing a number of institutional networks at global, supra-national, national, and local scales. In the final section, we consider the translation of the ideas and practices of the smart city into the policies and work of city administrations. In particular, we consider what might be termed the 'last mile problem' and the reasons why, despite a vast and active set of technocrats and epistemic community and advocacy coalition, smart city initiatives are yet to become fully mainstreamed and the smart city mission successfully realized in cities across the globe. We illustrate this last mile problem through a discussion of plans to introduce smart lighting in Dublin.
Introduction they need to draw on the competencies held within industry in particular (such as large global consultancies and the producers of software and hardware solutions) that possess sufficient expertise to guide city administrators and can deliver better city services through publicprivate partnerships, leasing, deregulation and market competition, or outright privatization.
In such sentiment, the logic of a reliable, low-cost, universal government provision in the public interest is supplemented or replaced by provision through the market, driven in-part or substantively by private interests (Graham and Marvin 2001; Collier et al., 2016) .
In this context, there has been a very large growth in consultancies offering specialist smart city services, employing a raft of new smart city 'experts' that provide advice, research,
A new epistemic community and advocacy coalition
This rapidly growing set of smart city professionals within city administrations, governments (local, national, supranational) , NGOs, industry, and academia suggest that a new smart cities epistemic community has been formed over the past decade. In his seminal work, Peter Haas (1992: 2) defined an epistemic community as 'network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.' Such a community of knowledge-based experts help decision-makers identify and define the problems they face along with possible policy solutions, and also to assess policy outcomes. Haas (1992) details that epistemic communities share a set of knowledge, normative and casual beliefs, and practices, and work in common action to forward a particular vision and policy response. They seek to provide contextual framing, advice and social learning to navigate a complex and uncertain social-economic political landscape (Dunlop 2011) , and exercise influence through their claims to insightful and authoritative knowledge that has high utility for decision-and policy-makers who maybe lacking sufficient expertise to make informed choices (Haas 2001) . Importantly, Haas (1992) argues that they differ from interest groups or policy networks through their claim to authoritative expertise. That said, in general terms, epistemic communities are not necessarily composed of technical and theoretical knowledge experts: they can also emerge from communities of practice which connect experience and practical knowledge, such as in the case of activist and concerned civic groups operating in the health sector (Akrich 2010); or 'expert amateurs' and communities engaged in 'citizen sensing' and peer-to-peer collaboration (Gabrys 2014; Tironi and Criado 2015) .
Through their work and network, an epistemic community seeks to reshape the policy landscape and political agenda, but also to reconfigure how policy is made and implemented, and reorganize the associated institutional and organizational landscape. If successful, the community's ideas and practices become institutionalized over time, continuing to shape how problems and solutions are identified and tackled. The community operates and grows through social learning (teaching others their ideas) and professional networking (through working arrangements, workshops, conferences, etc.). Members of an epistemic community can originate from a number of professional, institutional and academic backgrounds -as well as be transnational in nature, working at scales from the local to the global (Dunlop 2013) . Decision-and policy-makers can also be members of the community, helping to formulate and distribute ideas and best practices to other constituents. Those studying epistemic communities seek to understand how likeminded actors coalesce into a coherent body, how their ideas and practices develop over time and space, and the resources and mechanisms through which their knowledge and advice are introduced into institutional and political processes (Haas 2001) . Dunlop (2013: 230) notes that 'to identify an epistemic community is to identify a set of actors with the professional and social stature to make authoritative claims on politically pertinent and socially relevant issues of the day.' Given that in general terms smart city professionals claim and are often given authoritative voice, share a set of knowledge, beliefs, practices, and aim to craft a particular vision and policy response to urban issues, it thus seems fair to conclude that they constitute an epistemic community. That said, it is also the case that there is a blurred line between a smart city epistemic community and smart city vested interest groups. The two overlap with respect to how they think urban issues should be addressed through technological solutions, and they work in concert to form an 'advocacy coalition' -that is, a coalition of 'people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system' and 'who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time ' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 25) . However, while theoretically an epistemic community does not have direct pecuniary incentives to seek to shape the policy landscape, being driven by normative beliefs, some elements of advocacy coalitions are also motivated by a desire to provide solutions and generate profit. In the latter case, not only is substantive policy advice (means) and policy proposals (ends) being proffered (usually for a hefty fee), but a pathway to a particular solution usually provided by private enterprise (Dunlop 2013) . As such, the kinds of advice given by a tech/consultancy company such as IBM is far from impartial and not simply rooted in authorative knowledge expertise, a particular technical approach, and a belief in the power of technology as the most effective way to run cities and fix urban problems. That said, epistemic communities are also clearly driven by self-interest -to see their ideas implemented and to control a policy domain. Dunlop (2013) notes that the success of an epistemic community is dependent on penetrating governmental institutions and machinery in two ways. First, by insinuating themselves into key bureaucratic positions. Second, by building consensus and persuading institutional actors and decision-makers to their ideas and logic through social learning. Such social learning can take a number of forms. Dunlop (2013) lists five: (1) learning as instrumental -the passing on in technical rather than political terms new ideas and knowledge; (2) learning as persuasion and socialization -seeking to convince actors to change their views on an issue; (3) learning as calculation -as a pragmatic means to achieve a particular end that suits both decision-maker and epistemic community; (4) learning as legitimacy -rather than a decision-maker learning 'what works', they seek legitimacy through the symbolic power of the epistemic community's authority; (5) learning as unreflective -as uncritically accepting the ideas and advice of an epistemic community, usually when the general ideas of the community have already been institutionalized. In the case of smart cities, such social learning might occur through consultancy, professional development training, conferences and workshops, co-option in project bids, and hackathons.
With respect to the smart city, an epistemic community and advocacy coalition is evident at four scales: global, supra-national, national and local.
Global epistemic community and advocacy coalition
In just a handful of years, a number of sizable global smart city consortia have been formed consisted of aligned actors who share a common vision with regards to how cities should be managed and urban issues addressed. Each consortia makes claims to provide city administrations with authorative, neutral, expert advice, resources, and partnerships that can cut through the complexities of managing cities to provide guidance on how to use digital technologies to solve difficult issues/problems. objectives align strongly with enabling the smart city epistemic community and vested interests to achieve their goal of shaping urban policy and practices. URBACT's desired outcome is to: ensure practioners and decision-makers have access to knowledge and knowhow on all aspects of sustainable urban development; improve the capacity of cities to manage sustainable urban policies; improve the design of urban policies and practices; and improve the implementation of integrated urban strategies and actions. It plans to achieve these objectives by facilitating transnational exchange (enabling policy mobility), capacity building (social learning), and capitalisation and dissemination.
National and local-level epistemic community and advocacy coalition
While the global and supra-national scales provide a transnational means for the knowledge of epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions to circulate and propagate, it is at the national and local-level that the grounding of their ideas takes place through their embedding in institutional structures, appointment of personnel at different scales of government (e.g., national-level departments and agencies, and regional and local/municipal authorities), and the development of specific policies and deployments. Cork Gateway act as entry routes for the epistemic community and local advocacy coalition into the wider institutional structures.
Bridging the 'last mile' problem
As detailed, over the past decade: a set of smart city professionals have been successfully inserted into city administrations; an active and lively smart city epistemic community and advocacy coalition has been formed at different scales; an extensive and diverse apparatus of social learning has been rolled out; and in many cases funding opportunities to support smart city initiatives have been created enabling numerous initiatives to be deployed. However, while smart city policy and programmes are being implemented in many cities, it is clear that, with a couple of exceptions that have unique characteristics 25 , they are fragmented in nature and the smart city vision is only partially embedded within city administrations at present.
Consequently, the ideas, policies and technologies of the smart city movement have only gained partial traction in driving how city bureaucracies manage and govern their jurisdictions and approach tackling urban issues. Moreover, they are being greeted with apathy or resistance by some staff. In other words, it seems that promoters and technocrats of the smart city vision are having difficulty 'bridging the last mile' from theory and vision to fully mainstreamed policies and adoption across organizations. Here, we want to consider the 23 http://smartdublin.ie/about/ 24 http://www.corksmartgateway.ie/ 25 The exceptions are cities such as Songdo (South Korea) and Masdar (UAE) which have been built on greenfield sites from scratch in the past decade or so and were explicitly pitched as smart city developments (see Cugurullo 2013; Shwayri 2013; Shin et al. 2015) . Both cities are unusual with respect to their development history, being conceived and financed by private interests, and are effectively 'gated-communities' at scale. Most of their governance is also delivered through privatised services. Neither is therefore a typical city which has developed over a much longer period of time within a framework of state-led governance.
often treating the city as a technical system as opposed to a multifaceted place. The result is a form of technological solutionism in which digital technologies are positioned as the answer to all issues, regardless of context and history. Consequently, there has been a marked pushback against the ideas and ideals of the smart city in recent years, especially concerning the role of citizens, the technocratic nature of governance and its instrumental rationality, and the marketization of public services (Greenfield 2013; Kitchin 2014; Mattern 2014; Datta 2015) .
While the smart city movement has targeted city administrations with some success, it has had less engagement with local politicians and the public, and has largely ignored alternative academic views other than to counter with a call for citizen-engaged smart cities (which tends to be limited to user-feedback rather than bottom-up ownership and participation).
Fuelling resistance and doubts is a sense that the majority of smart city technology is not yet mature and unsuitable for mainstreaming. Technologies are still being developed and tested. They are like drugs in the clinical trial phase. This is borne-out in the large number of pilot projects and what has been termed 'experimental' or 'testbed' urbanism or 'living labs.'
Practically all EU-funded smart city projects have this status, being initiatives to scope-out, produce and implement proof-of-concepts, and share knowledge about efforts, rather than being market-ready and proven to work in practice. Moreover, it is fair to say that, as with other epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions (Dunlop 2013) , there is some diversity of views within them, as well as a structure and power dynamics as to who is shaping and driving the agenda. As such, while there is a general consensus on the utility of digital technologies for tackling urban issues, there is not universal agreement on the form of technical solution or related factors such as the role of citizens in shaping how issues are tackled (Townsend 2013). In other words, smart city ideas and technology are still very much in development phase and investing in them poses a risk for city administrations charged with providing stability, certainty, and reliability in the delivery of city services.
Fostering scepticism is a lack of trust among many city administrators as to whether a smart city approach will work in practice. Cities have a long history of purchasing technologies that are costly and do not always deliver on their promises. This includes the first wave of smart city products sold to them that bound them into unfavourable contracts and supplied technical solutions that did not deliver on their promises. One consequence is that cities are becoming more savvy with the procurement process to ensure that they do not lose control of a service or associated data/IP and that companies provide the service desired.
An additional concern relates to financing and the amount of perceived value for money spent and the return on investment. Many smart city solutions are expensive to procure and service, yet it is not always clear what the return on investment will be beyond promises that a service will improve or an issue be ameliorated in some way. Moreover, it is clear that the same technology will be cheaper and better-in terms of spec, functionality, performance-in a few years, so it is difficult to know when to make the initial investment.
Many cities are currently operating in a condition of austerity, so finances for new investments are constrained. As such, although some technologies could save the city money over the long term, the city still must find the initial investment capital. This is why so much effort is now being expended on new business models for smart city investments. Another issue is competing demands for finance with a limited budget. Many services are statutory obligations and unless the smart city technology can address these critical issues, they will have trouble competing for attention and resources. 'So it is very easy for a local authority to install an LED now and get maximum effect in terms of energy savings and you will get that from the month you put that in you will start to achieve those savings.' (Utilities representative)
On the other, the initial infrastructure costs for updating the network to accommodate CMS would be so enormous that they would nullify any benefits:
'Listen, there will be savings but they will not be savings over the extra cost that you would have been paying. So if you look at it in real terms, there is probably no saving in public lighting because there has been so little investment in it for a number of years, columns need to be replaced [as well as cabling and ducting], so anything that you are saving on the energy side you will have to put back into investing in new infrastructure' (Senior Civil Servant, Dublin City Council).
The lighting department of Dublin City Council currently manages 45,000 lighting units. The current thinking behind any systems upgrade is to address the statutory obligations of public lighting at the best price for the authority, not to address any 'smart city' solution that might be facilitated through advanced CMS usage:
'Cost wise, we are after doing the tender now and the replacement for those lamps would be about €250 each. They are not that expensive, that is a pretty good price.
But we would intend to roll those LEDs out with pre-programmed dimming [that is, without the ability to be controlled from a distance]. That is what we do. And that is basically where we stand.' (Senior Lighting Engineer, DCC).
There is also a worry concerning the accumulated risks from implementing CMS and upgrading infrastructure (poles, cabling, etc.):
'Your question about the central management system, I think that is another new innovation and again there is a risk involved in that and I think this has got to be taken into account. So if you have one risk, a certain amount, if you have a second one at the same time, it is the square of the risk, so it is four times the risk for two innovations and nine times for three, a square law rather than a linear one.'
(Representative of an environmental agency)
In addition, a smart city advocate inside the organization noted that it was difficult to drive change internally:
'Obviously there is a huge knock-on benefit for industry if we are more proactive in terms of our assets. So that is an ongoing piece because one of the challenges is internally there is a huge resistance to looking at anyone touching any of these assets in a way that can drive new opportunities. So that is a key one because it is fine for me to present internally and say I think we should be doing this. And people are like, who the hell are you? You are just an upshot that has rolled in and you are telling us what to do.' (Smart Dublin worker, DCC)
Instead of a city-wide roll-out, Dublin is continuing to develop small-scale deployments. One example is in the Dublin Docklands, itself considered as a 'smart district'
for trialling a number of other new technologies such as a smart grid, e-mobility, and environmental sensors. The roll-out of smart lighting in the Docklands responds both to more prosaic fundamentals such as the fact that local lighting is metered unlike elsewhere, and to the medium to long-term goals of ensuring the area showcases the modern and creative capital city as a desired location for investment and locating employment. Within the smart district, lighting is seen as both a key utility infrastructure and as a platform for deploying other smart technologies (such as Wi-Fi, sensor deployments, public communication signs, CCTV). While the potential is there to upscale after test-bedding in the Docklands, the agency of the advocacy coalition in the rest of the city region is less powerful, hindered by political resistance to market intrusion, limited budgets for infrastructure and public sector personnel, and institutional and procedural inertia. Perhaps unsurprisingly, city managers generally prefer to exploit the second-mover advantage-that is, the advantage of knowing the system will work in solving a particular problem and improve city services. For example, if city management is going to upgrade 45,000 lampposts to smart lighting, they want to be confident that the system is going to work well and do what was promised. They do not want a newspaper headline that states, "€15 Million of Taxpayers' Money Wasted."
In addition, the epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions coalescing around the field of smart cities seem to little appreciate the need for democracy, openness and public consultation in city management: mostly, executive decisions are made outside of democratic process and city managers green-light smart city projects with little political, media or public oversight or feedback. In the case of Dublin, local politicians and the public have been ignored almost entirely in the formulation of Smart Dublin and the development and rollout of smart city initiatives. Indeed, nearly all decisions for selecting and implementing smart city initiatives seem to have bypassed public consultation and political debate. As such, the focus of the epistemic community and advocacy has been exclusively targeted at the city bureaucracy. This is perhaps no surprise given that the city has no mayor and is largely run by the CEOs of the four local authorities.
Conclusion
We have argued in this paper that over the past decade a sizeable and influential smart city epistemic community and advocacy coalition has developed at multiple scales. In a short space of time a new cadre of smart city technocrats -CIOs, CTOs, CDOs, data scientists, designers, policy specialists, software engineers, and project managers -have been appointed to roles in city administrations, organizational structures have been re-jigged to accommodate them, and a raft of new smart city initiatives have been implemented. These technocrats are working with, and supported by, a panoply of external professionals within institutional bodies, academia and companies, who provide a range of services and enact social learning through consultancy, professional development training, conferences and workshops, cooperation in project work, and hackathons. While there are communities of scholars and 'expert amateurs' that forward an alternative vision of smart cities, particularly a version that is more citizen-focused, -engaged or -run, the dominant paradigm of smart cities is still rooted in a technocratic formulation, albeit one that now acknowledges the need for citizen participation though very much from a civic paternalist or stewardship perspective (Shelton and Lobato 2016).
Collectively the smart city epistemic community and advocacy coalition is starting to reshape urban policy, how funding is distributed and spent, and how city government works, including aiding its marketisation. However, due to a number of issues -not least of which is the relative immaturity of the policy and technical solutions being offered, along with institutional inertia -smart city ideas and ideals have only become partially embedded in city administrations. In effect, while the smart city movement has captured some of the bureaucratic and political terrain at local, national and supra-national scales (e.g., some mayors, Britain's Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, and various EU bodies) it has a 'last mile' problem in many cities.
The extent of this last mile issue varies between municipalities and cities. power to enact change. Collectively, the LAs are experimenting with using procurement by challenge, but on single issues such as increasing the modal share of bicycle use rather than wholesale infrastructure concerns.
26 As stated in several of our research interviews with officials.
The challenge then for smart city advocates is to bridge this 'last mile', persuading key decision-makers that the smart city approach to managing cities and tackling urban issues through digital technology solutions will radically improve the lives of citizens and help businesses thrive. For this to occur, they need to continue to further enhance the reputation of the epistemic community, strengthen the advocacy coalition, capture more bureaucratic positions, demonstrate the utility of their proposed approach, win the ideological argument over the marketization of city services, and deliver proven, mature, dependable solutions. For those opposed to the notion of a smart city as presently conceived, the challenge is to either re-orientate the imaginaries and logics of the smart city (Townsend 2013; Kitchin 2016) or to offer an entirely alternative view of how cities should be run and managed and urban issues tackled, one rooted in a different set of politics and ideology (e.g., rights, citizenship, participation). These are the battle lines for the next few years.
The smart city epistemic community and advocacy coalition shows no signs of abating, but rather are continuing to grow as ever more technical and scientific academics (e.g., engineers, computer scientists, data scientists, physicists, mathematicians) and companies turn their attention to urban issues and cities further embrace technological solutions to urban management and governance. Those opposing their ideas and ideals show few signs of becoming less entrenched in their critique and the last mile issues we detail will not dissipate overnight. How this will ultimately play out is difficult to pre-determine, but it is fair to say that the new technocrats are unlikely to be leaving city government any time soon, many ICT solutions already deployed are embedded in city governance (e.g., intelligent transport systems) and unlikely to be decommissioned, and large investment is being ploughed into developing and trialling new technology for deployment across domains (e.g., transport, energy, economy, environment, homes).
